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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 
Plaintiff and appellant 
vs. 
KAY D. JENKINS 
Defendant 
and 
WILLIAM E. MEEKS AND JORJANNA 
I. MEEKS his wife 
Intervenors and Third Party 
Plaintiffs and Respondent 
vs. 
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 
AND GOLDEN W. ROBBINS 
Third Party Defendants and 
Appellant 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a Judgment lien. The judgment 
was obtained in this case and became a lien upon defend-
ant's real property. Execution was issued to sell the real 
property. The intervenors, Meeks, got a temporary in-
junction in the case restraining the plaintiff, his attorney 
and the sheriff from selling the property, claiming that 
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erty without notice relying upon an invalid Satisfaction of 
Judgment which was not verified and was not signed 
by the Plaintiff's attorney, which Satisfaction of Judgment 
was vacated by the court. 
That intervenors were allowed to intervene in this 
action after Judgment and the court quieted title in inter-
venors. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court held that the Intervenors became the own-
ers of the fee title to the property at the time when the 
Satisfaction of Judgment was on file and before the Satis-
faction had been vacated and quieted title in intervenors. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks for reversal of the Judgment and that 
the court holds that the Judgment was a lien at all times 
and that anyone dealing with the property was not a bona 
fide purchaser for value, but took it subject to the lien 
and that execution was properly issued. 
That the abstract company and title company acting 
through the Meeks could not bring an injunction. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Plaintiff obtained a Judgment on November 27, 
1967 in the above case against Kay D. Jenkins. (R. 6). 
Thereafter Supplemental Orders were issued. (R. 7). The 
defendant was examined and as a result of the examina-
2 
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tion it was found that he was the owner of the property in 
Salt Lake County being Lot 14 Fairlane Heights Subdivi-
sion. 
That on December 31, 19695 a Satisfaction of Judg-
ment was filed without the signature of the Plaintiff's 
attorney and without his knowledge or consent and it was 
not verified. (R. 15). On May 14, 1970, a Motion to Set 
Aside Satisfaction of Judgment was filed supported by 
Affidavit. (R. 16-18). On May 26, 1970, an Order was 
made setting aside and vacating the Satisfaction of Judg-
ment. (R. 20). 
An Execution was issued and given to the Sheriff 
(R. 47-48-49-50), and the Sheriff levied upon the prop-
erty at 14 Fairlane Heights Subdivision. That before the 
date of the sale, an Order to Show Cause and Temporary 
Restraining Order was issued enjoining and restraining 
the Plaintiff and Plaintiff's attorney and the Sheriff from 
continuing with the sale. 
That Kay D. Jenkins was not served with any plead-
ings by Intervenor and did not appear in the action and 
was not represented by any attorney. 
The property was sold by Kay D. Jenkins to Wallace 
J. Belnap, see Warranty Deed and Exhibit 21 Tpp. Page 
31, dated September 30, 1969, Recorded March 17, 1970. 
Wallace J. Belnap and his wife conveyed to William 
E. Meeks and Jorjanna I. Meeks, his wife, by a Quit Claim 
3 
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Deed dated January 2, 1970, recorded March 17, 1970. 
See Deposition of Jorjanna I. Meeks, Exhibit and Ex-
hibit 21 Tpp, Page 32. 
That Kay D. Jenkins and his wife conveyed the prop-
erty to William E. Meeks and Jorjanna I. Meeks, his wife, 
by Warranty Deed dated September 30, 1969, acknowl-
edged August 17, 1970, Recorded October 27, 1970. See 
the Deed in the deposition of Jorjanna I. Meeks, Exhibit 
and Exhibit 21 Tpp, Page 37. The Deed was notor-
ized and recorded after the Satisfaction of Judgment had 
been set aside and vacated. 
Various Motions were filed and ruled on by various 
Judges. The pleadings, Motions and ruling on them are 
set out below: 
An Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining 
Order was issued Exparte (R. 32-35, R. 38-39). That in-
tervenor also made a Motion to Intervene as Defendant 
(R. 21-27). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion Pertaining to the Order to 
Show Cause, Temporary Restraining Order, and Motion to 
Intervene, (R. 43), on the grounds that the Order to Show 
Cause and Temporary Restraining Order failed to state 
facts upon which relief could be granted. That it was 
heard by the Court. That a Motion to reconsider was filed 
September 17, 1971, (R. 64), and the final Memorandum 
Decision was made by Judge Stewart M. Hanson on Jan-
uary 26, 1972 (R. 82), denying Plaintiff's Motion to Quash 
and granting Defendant Motion to Intervene. Formal 
Order signed and filed February 1, 1972, (R. 83-84). 
4 
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Plaintiff objected to the Order Granting Intervenors 
Motion to Intervene and denying Plaintiff's Motion to 
Quash. (R. 85). 
That the Intervenor filed two Motions for Relief 
from Judgment (R. 28-30) (R. 74-76). Plaintiff filed 
Answer to Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion 
supported by Affidavit of Golden W. Robbins and Gloria 
Garwood, (R. 68-73). Plaintiff and Intervenors filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 87 and 89). That the 
Intervener's Motion for Relief from Judgment and the 
two Motions for Summary Judgment were heard before 
Judge Earl M. Marshall, Judge Pro Tern, and the court 
denied the three Motions, but the Order provided Inter-
venor could file a responsive pleading. Minute entry (R. 
92-101). Formal Order (R. 103). 
That the Intervenors filed a Motion to Reconsider 
and Objections to Order (R. 96, 97, 99) of Judge Marshall. 
Intervenor also filed a Motion to bring in Third Party 
Defendant and file Third Party Complaint. (R. 111). 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Intervenors Motion 
to Bring in Third Party Defendant and to file Third Party 
Complaint. (R. 115-116), and filed a Brief. (R. 117-130). 
The Court made an Order granting the Motion to 
Bring in Third Party Defendant, as to Golden W. Robbins 
only and no other parties added or joined in these pro-
ceedings. Minute Entry (R. 131). Formal Order (R. 133). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Objections to the said Order allowing Golden W* 
Robbins to be joined as party and that there should be 
no additional parties. (R. 134-135). Brief submitted by 
Intervenor. 
Final Order, (R. 154-155), joining Golden W. Rob-
bins as a party to the action and providing, "It is further 
ordered there shall be no additional parties added or 
joined in these proceedings." (R. 154-155). 
Objections to Proposed Order. (R. 156-157). 
Objections Defenses and Answer to Third Party Com-
plaint filed by Golden W. Robbins (R. 161-164). 
Objections, Defenses and Answer to Third Party 
Complaint by Plaintiff (R. 165-167). 
That the Plaintiff, by his Answer and other pleadings, 
raised certain issues and at the beginning of the trial also 
raised objections and issues as follows: (R. 161-164) and 
R. 249-269) 
1. That the issue in this case is whether or not a 
valid release of Judgment was executed and whether an 
execution can issue. 
2. That the purported Satisfaction of Judgment re-
lied on by Intervenors in this case, (R. 15), which is Ex-
hibit 3 TPP and attached to the Intervenors Brief, (R. 
138) did not amount to a satisfaction of Judgment. 
3. The court does not have jurisdiction and it was 
not proper in the action to interject an injunction suit into 
6 
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this case and there were no facts upon which an injunction 
could be granted. (R. 161). 
4. That the Court does not have jurisdiction and it 
was not proper in this action to interplead third-party de-
fendant for the purpose of quieting title. (R. 161) That 
the court erred in allowing the Intervenors to intervene. 
5. That the Court erroneously made an Order pre-
venting this answering defendant from making the Mc-
Ghie Land Title Company and Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corporation party defendants. (R. 161) 
6. That the defendant, Kay D. Jenkins, had none of 
the pleadings served upon him. That he was a necessary 
party to these proceedings (R. 249-250 and R. 260) 
7. That a stranger to this lawsuit has no right to 
enjoin the plaintiff in this case. (R. 254) 
8. There was never any estoppel plead and no facts 
to support an estoppel in this case. That the Judgment was 
always in the clerk's office with the name of the attorney 
on it and never satisfied by the attorney and always giving 
notice (R. 256, Line 14). 
9. Plaintiff contends that all issues raised by the 
pleadings and raised at the beginning of the Trial should 
have been considered and decided by the trial court (R. 
258 line 19-23). After these issues were raised, the court 
was of the erroneous opinion that because of the filing of 
the purported Satisfaction of Judgment that plaintiff and 
his counsel lost the right to issue execution. The court 
erroneously thought that the Third Party Plaintiff can 
7 
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nevertheless rely upon an invalid Satisfaction of Judg-
ment. (R. 263-264) 
The Meeks relied upon the McGhie Land Title Com-
pany and the insurance Company, Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corporation the same as a person would rely upon an 
attorneys opinion on an abstract. They did not know any-
thing about what was in the record. Mrs. Meeks testi-
fied as follows: 
McGhie Land Title Company was to furnish a 
good title to the property to the Meeks. (P. 316) 
On Page 316 of the transcript it says: 
Q: "And they were to furnish you with a good title 
to this property, the McGhie Land Title Company ?" 
A: "Yes, but I didn't understand the document and" 
Q: "You have been relying on that title to this 
property and that you had a good insurance policy pro-
tecting you from any lien on this property. You have a 
policy that does that?" 
A: "Yes. yes." 
Q: And that was issued and that is the policy which 
is in evidence? Is that correct? 
A: "Yes" 
McGhie Land Title Company took care of all record-
ing (P. 305) 
8 
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That the McGhie Land Title Company and the Law-
yers Title Insurance Corporation are the ones who have 
been taking care of this suit as they should under their 
policy and Mrs. Meeks testified as follows: 
McGhie Land Title Company sent Mrs. Meeks to 
Earl Staten (R. 311) 
Mrs. Meeks went to see Mr. Larsen at McGhie Land 
Title Company in June (R. 313). 
The Title Company told the Meeks Mr. Staten was 
to handle the lawsuit. 
The Meeks brought in execution to McGhie Land 
Title Company (R. 314) 
Mr. Larsen of the McGhie Land Title Company told 
Mr. Meeks that the title Company would take care of the 
lawsuit and Mr. Staten would handle it. (R. 314 and 315) 
Q: "Now you have never paid an attorney fee to 
Mr. Staten and you have never promised to pay an attor-
ney fee?" 
A: "No, we have not. (R. 316)" 
That Wallace C. McDermaid was vice president of 
McGhie Land Title Company and testified that they closed 
the deal and that they were paid and they issued a policy 
of title insurance in the Lawyers Title Insurance Corpo-
ration insuring the fee simple title in the Meeks. At the 
time of trial he had the file of McGhie Land Title Com-
pany in which there was a report from the Pioneer Title 
9 
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Company showing the Judgment entered in the above 
entitled case. (R. 336, Exhibit 22 TPD). He further testi-
fied: 
Q: "And you were representing the Meeks to see 
that they had good title?" (R. 337). 
A: "Yes." 
Q: "And they would not have a good title unless 
that" (judgment of the Plaintiff) "was satisfied?" 
A: "That's right." (R. 337) 
Q: "And all the rest of the responsibility is yours 
in bringing the search of the title and seeing that the title 
is good?" (R. 343) 
A: "That's right. As agent for them it was the re-
sponsibility of the Company, not necessarily mine." 
Q: "And all the rest of the responsibility is yours in 
making the search of the title and seeing that the title 
is good?" 
A: "That's right, as agent for them it's a responsi-
bility of the Company, not necessarily mine." (R. 343). 
He testified that there was no name of the attorney 
on the release. 
Q: "This was in your deposition? I call your atten-
tion to where it says: Attorney for the Judgment creditor. 
There is no name or signature there is there?" See Exhibit 
3TPP 
A: "No." (R. 344) 
10 
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He did not make a search in the Clerk's office (R. 344) 
Further Question: "But you didn't bother to go to 
the Clerk's office?" 
A: "No." (R. 345) 
And he testified that Exhibit 3 TPP, he relied on 
the original and it doesn't show any attorney signed it. 
(R. 346, Exhibit 3 TPP). 
That at the close of Intervenors evidence, Plaintiff 
made a Motion for Dismissal, (R 352-353) which was 
denied by the court. 
Golden W. Robbins was sworn and testified that a 
letter was mailed by him to McGhie Land Title company 
dated January 28, 1970 stating that he had Judgment, 
(R. 358, Exhibit 24 TPD) which letter was mailed before 
there was any closing or conveyance to the Meeks. 
Letter to Mr. William E. Meeks, Exhibit 18 TPD, 
dated April 24, 1970 setting out that he had a Judgment, 
which letter was mailed before they received the Deed 
from Kay D. Jenkins and before they had paid all the 
money to Belnaps and to the Mortgage Company. 
Letter to Earl Staten from Attorney Robbins setting 
out the amount due on the Judgment. (R. 359, Exhibit 
26 TPD) 
Intervenors contend they never received Notice of 
Motion to Set aside Satisfaction of Judgment. 
11 
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There is in the file of McGhie Land Title Company 
an envelope of Golden W. Robbins post marked May 13, 
1970 addressed to the Meeks, Exhibit 23 TPP. This un-
doubtedly was the enevelope in which the Meeks received 
a copy of the Motion to Set Aside the Satisfaction of Judg-
ment (R. 16), certificate by Golden W. Robbins that the 
Motion to Set Aside Satisfaction of Judgment was mailed 
on May 13, 1970. 
That Attorney Robbins testified that he had the case 
on a contingent basis. 
That Attorney Robbins filed a Counter Claim. 
Attorney Robbins testified that the work he had done 
in this case was reasonably worth $5,000.00. 
That the Third Party Defendant, Golden W. Robbins 
felt it was necessary to set out his claim for damages and 
ask for an attorney fee, but he told the court that he 
thought that this matter was not properly in the law suit 




NO VALID SATISFACTION OF JUDG-
MENT. THE ATTORNEY'S LIEN WAS NOT 
WAIVED. EXECUTION SHOULD HAVE IS-
SUED. INTERVENORS WERE NOT BONA 
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE. THERE 
WAS NO ESTOPPEL. 
12 
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The court held that the Meeks, Intervenors, relied on 
the Record and were bona fide purchasers for value with-
out Notice actually or constructively and the Satisfaction 
had been entered upon the docket of the court pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58 B(d) and ceased 
to be a lien until the Satisfaction of Judgment was vacated 
and that the lien could not then attach for the reason that 
the fee title was no longer in the Judgment Debtor, but 
had become vested in the Meeks. (R. 225) 
It is our contention that the court erred in so holding 
for the following reasons:. 
That the Meeks did not get a Warranty Deed from 
the Judgment Debtor, Kay D. Jenkins until after the Satis-
faction of Judgment had been set aside. (R. 20) 
Apparently the Belnaps had some question about the 
liens because they gave a Quit Claim Deed that was re-
corded on March 17, 1970 from Belnaps to Meeks, but it 
was only a quit claim deed and at the time the Belnaps got 
their deed all they got was title subject to the lien of the 
Plaintiff and when they conveyed to the Meeks, all they 
conveyed was what they had and the fee title was not con-
veyed to the Meeks, but it was subject to any and all liens. 
There was always Notice that the Plaintiff's attor-
ney had a lien and that he had not satisfied the Judgment. 
The Law is clear in the state of Utah. That parties 
cannot abbrogate or disregard the attorney's lien. 
Section 78-22-1 provides: 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"LIEN OF JUDGMENT — From the time the 
judgment is docketed it becomes a lien upon all the 
real property of the Judgment debtor * * * * 
The attorney is the only one who can give a valid 
release of the lien. The release was not valid. The release 
was not authorized. The abstract and title companies well 
knew that there was an attorney's lien which io created by 
virtue of section 78-51-41, which is as follows: 
"78-51-41. Compensation — Lien —. The com-
pensation of an attorney and counselor for his ser-
vices is governed by agreement, express or implied, 
or the service of an answer containing a counter-
claim, the attorney who appears for a party has a 
lien upon his client's cause of action or counter-
claim, which attached to a verdict, report, decision 
or judgment in his client's favor and to the pro-
ceeds thereof in whosever hands they may come 
and cannot be affected by any settlement between 
the parties before or after judgment." 
In the 1973 Supplement, Utah Code, under 78-51-41, 
page 107, it states: 
"Where plaintiff's attorney was to receive a con-
tingent fee of 1/3 of whatever was obtained from 
the defendant, whether money or property and the 
judgment obtained was satisfied by a sheriff's sale 
of defendant's realty to plaintiff in which plain-
tiffs bid was less than the amount owed on the 
judgment by defendant, plaintiffs attorney held a 
1/3 interest in the land plaintiff purchased since 
the land was paid for with the judgment debt, 1/3 
of which belonged to the attorney. Petrie v. Gen-
eral Contracting Co., 17 U. (2d) 408, 413 P. 2d 
600." 
14 
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And quoting from the case itself as follows, on page 
601, bottom of second column, it says: 
"Sec. 78-51-41 UCA, 1953 provides that an attor-
ney, * * * has a lien upon his client's * * * 
judgment * * and to the proceeds thereof * * *. 
Where the recovery is real estate the lien attaches 
to it; and this is also true where real estate is taken 
in satisfaction of a judgment." 
Under Section 78-51-41 with many other cases is 
annotated the case of Jeffries v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 
63 P2d 242, 90 U 2d 525, at page 244 of the Pacific, it 
states under note (2), second column: 
"In construing this statute, this court, through a 
long line of cases, has repeatedly held that an attor-
ney may prosecute his client's cause of action to 
judgment and his client's name, solely for the pur-
pose of protecting his lien for the amount of his 
fee in the case, and that his lien may not be de-
feated by a settlement efefcted without his con-
sent. Sandberg v. Victor, etc. Mining Co. 18 Utah, 
66, 55 P 74; Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., v. 
National Bank, etc. 18 Utah, 87, 55 P. 72, 72 Am. 
St. Rep. 767; Croco v. Oregon S.L.R.R. Co., 18 
Utah, 311, 54 P. 985, 44 LRA. 285; Potter v. Ajax 
Mining Co. 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270; Potter v. Ajax 
Mining Co., 22 Utah, 273 61 P. 999; Broadbent v. 
Denver & R.G. Ry. Co. 48 Utah, 598, 160 P. 1185; 
Lundy v. Cappucio, 54 Utah, 420, 181 P. 165; 
Mountain States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-Allen Co., 
63 Utah, 384, 225 P. 811. 
In Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 19 Utah, 421, at 
page 430, 57 P. 270-272, Supra, this court in con-
sidering the same statute, said: "the language * * * 
is comprehensive, and creates a direct lien in favor 
of the attorney upon his client's cause of action, 
15 
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in whatever form it may arrume, in the entire 
course of litigation and entitled the attorney to 
follow the proceeds, without regard to any settle-
ment before or after the judgment. It being a statu-
tory lien, every one must take notice of it, and 
any one settling with the client without the knowl-
edge of the attorney does so at his own risk." 
One of the cases set out in the citation above is the 
case of Potter v. Ajax Mining Company 61 P. 999 and is a 
case in which a settlement was made with the defendant 
by plaintiff's attorney and a satisfaction filed. A Motion 
was made to set aside the Satisfaction of Judgment. On 
page 1000, close to the top of the first column, it states: 
"Upon a hearing, the court made an order setting 
aside the dismissal of said action and allowing said 
attorney to prosecute said cause of action for the 
purpose of determining the amount of their fees 
and expenses." 
And on page 1001, towards the bottom of the second 
column, the court says: 
"an agreement between attorneys and their client 
that they are to be paid for their services rendered 
in the prosecution of a suit and reimbursed for 
money advanced from the proceeds of the judg-
ment which should be obtained, operates as an 
assignment, of the judgment to the attorney to the 
extent of such claim and until the same are paid 
the plaintiff can give no valid discharge of the 
Judgment." 
We have Rule 58 B(d) entitled Satisfaction of Judg-
ment and we quote: 
"(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A Judg-
ment may be satisfied in whole or in part as to 
16 
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any or all of the judgment debtors by the owner 
thereof or by the attorney of record of the judg-
ment creditor. * * by written instrument duly 
acknowledged by such owner or attorney." 
Rule 58 B(d) and section 78-51-41 (The attorney's 
lien section) must be construed together and when read in 
the light of the quotation from the case of Ajax supra: 
"operates as an assignment of the Judgment to the 
attorney to the extent of such claim and until the 
same are paid the plaintiff can give no valid dis-
charge of the judgment." 
Rule 58 B(d) says that the owner or attorney. The 
Plaintiff is not the owner of the Judgment until the attor-
ney's lien is paid or discharged and the attorney is the only 
person who can give a valid Satisfaction until his lien 
is paid. 
I want to call the court's attention to what is said 
in Potter v. Ajax Mining, supra, "It being a statutory lien, 
everyone must take notice." 
The McGhie Land Title Company and the Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corporation and their customer ,the Meeks 
were bound to take notice of the Attorney's statutory lien. 
POINT II 
NO GROUNDS FOR AN INJUNCTION. 
ERROR TO ALLOW INTERVENORS TO IN-
TERVENE IN THE SUIT. McGHIE LAND 
TITLE COMPANY AND LAWYERS TITLE 
INSURANCE CORPORATION WERE THE 
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, BUT IF THE 
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ISSUE OF TITLE WAS TO BE TRIED THE 
ABSTRACT COMPANY AND THE TITLE 
COMPANY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE 
PARTIES. PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY AL-
WAYS HAD A LIEN AND WAS ALWAYS 
ENTITLED TO ISSUE EXECUTION. 
The McGhie Land Title Company and the Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corporation through the Meeks, a subse-
quent buyer, should have not been allowed to intervene 
in a suit between plaintiff and defendant after judgment 
and after an execution regular on its face has been levied 
upon the property which said property was owned by the 
judgment debtor at the time of the entry of the judgment. 
Section pertaining to Judgment lien is 78-22-1, and we 
quote: 
"78-22-1. LIEN OF JUDGMENT — From the 
time the judgment is docketed it becomes a lien 
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, 
not exempt from execution, in the county in which 
the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time 
or by him thereafter acquired during the existence 
of said lien. * * * The lien shall continue for 
eight years unless the judgment is previously satis-
fied or unless the enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient 
undertaking as provided by law, in which case 
the lien of the judgment ceases." 
This is not a case of parties intervening prior to judg-
ment, but is after judgment. That there is no rule or 
statute dealing with pleadings or relief after judgment 
other than Rule 60, which provides for relief from judg-
ments or orders. Section 60 states: 
"On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve a 
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party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order or proceeding for the following rea-
sons * * * such as excusable neglect." 
This section says party not subsequent purchaser of 
property covered by judgment lien. 
The section which deals with execution and proceed-
ings supplement thereto is Rule 69 and it provides: 
"ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION. Process 
to enforce a judgment shall be by a Writ of Execu-
tion unless the court otherwise directs, which may 
issue at any time within eight years after the entry 
of judgment # * # #" 
We submit that this section does not allow the bring-
ing of a distinct and separate cause of action by subse-
quent purchase against the plaintiff in the original action. 
The attempt of the subsequent purchaser to come into this 
lawsuit is not a matter of procedure, but is a matter of 
substantive law. We maintain that neither the new rules 
nor the statute has changed, but the law has been for years 
that a third party not a party to the action in which the 
execution has issued, cannot intervene in the original 
action. 
We submit to the court that the intervenors could not 
intervene in this action and we quote 23 C. J. at page 583 
section 505 which says: 
"505.2 Intervention in original action. 
A third person, not a party to the action in which 
execution has issued, cannot intervene in the origi-
nal action to claim property levied on under execu-
tion in such action where there is no statute author-
izing such procedure." 
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Volume 17 Pacific Digest, 101 P.2d Execution, Sec-
tion 1635 they quote a California case as follows: 
"Cal. App. No one except judgment debtor may 
move to quash a writ of execution or levy thereon 
unless the judgment upon which it is issued is, or 
the writ is, void on its face, — Blue v. Superior 
Court, Los Angeles County, 305 P.2d 209, 147 
C. A. 2d 278." 
The case of Blue v. Superior Court, 305 P.2d 209, on 
page 213 of the Pacific Reporter, bottom of first column 
and top of second says: 
"It is further established that no one except the 
judgment debtor may move to quash a writ of 
execution or the levy thereof unless the judgment 
upon which it is issued, is or the writ is void on its 
face. Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin, 110 Cal. App. 
385, 392, 294 P. 421; Vest v. Superior Court, 140 
Cal. App. 2d 91, 93, 294 P. 2d 988. A Levy cannot 
be quashed on the grounds that the judgment 
debtor has no interest in the property levied upon 
Vest v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal. App. 2d at 
page 93, 294 P. 2d 988, and cases there cited, and 
the court may not, in a proceeding had pursuant to 
the provisions of the Civil Code above referred to, 
define the interest of the judgment debtor in the 
property levied upon, or turn the proceeding into 
a plenary suit in equity in the nature of a creditor's 
bill. Strangman v. Duke, 140 Cal. App. 2d 185, 
192, 295 P.2d 12." 
And further on page 213 Section 6 it states: 
"the purchaser at the execution sale will acquire 
only such interest as the judgment debtor had in 
the property; and he may if he chooses take no fur-
ther steps to perfect his title and await action by 
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anyone claiming adversely, or may himself sue to 
quiet title against such adverse claims. Strangman 
v. Duke, supra, 140 Cal. App. 2d at pages 191, 
192, 295 P. 2d 12." 
In the case of Associated Oil Co. vs. Mullin, 294 P. 
421 cited above on page 424 of the Pacific it states as 
follows: 
"In the present case, however, the judgment is 
valid upon its face, and the execution issued there-
on was regular in form. Under such circumstances 
it is well settled that the court has no power to 
vacate an execution for the omissions or acts of the 
sheriff after the writ has duly come into his hands. 
23 C.J. Executions, §424, P. 540. Hence it has been 
held that a levy upon property exempt from execu-
tion is not a reason for recalling the writ (Roth v. 
Insley, 86 Cal. 134, 24 P. 853) nor can the levy 
be quashed on the ground that the judgment debtor 
has no interest in the property levied upon, as 
strangers to the action have means provided by law 
for protecting their rights (23 C.J. Executions, 
§ 285, P. 470; Bancroft Code Practice and Reme-
dies, § 1999, P. 2630). 
And the case above cited of Vest v. Superior Court, 
294 P.2d on page 990 it states: 
"Petitioner contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in quashing the writ of execution. It is 
the general rule that none but the parties to the 
action who are liable to be injured can move for 
recall of the writ, 23 C. J., Executions, sec. 426, 
P. 541, 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 144, unless the judg-
ment upon which it issued or the writ is void on its 
face. * * * * i n the present case, however, the 
judgment is valid upon its face, and the execution 
issued thereon was regular in form, Under such 
circumstances it is well settled that the court has 
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no power to vacate an execution for the omissions 
or acts of the sheriff after the writ has duly come 
into his hands, 23 C.J., Executions, Sec. 424, P. 
540, 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 143. Hence it has been 
held that a levy upon property exempt from execu-
tion is not a reason for recalling the writ, Roth v. 
Insley, quashed on the ground that the judgment 
debtor has no interest in the property levied upon, 
as strangers to the action have means provided by 
law for protecting their rights, 23 C.J., Executions, 
Sec. 285, p. 470, 33 C.J.S., Executions, § 109; Ban-
croft Code Practice and Remedies, Sec. 1999, p. 
2630. Associated Oil Co. v. Mullin, 110 Cal. App. 
385, 392, 294 P. 421; Roth v. Insley, 86 Cal. 134, 
24 P. 853, 11 Cal. Juris § 58, 64." 
At 33 C.J.S. Section 144 (c) they cite the case of Lex-
ington Land Co. v. Ambrister, and in 64 P.2d 703, 179 
Oklahoma 86 and on page 705 of the Pacific, bottom of 
second paragraph we quote: 
"This question has had the attention of a number 
of courts whose conclusion is aptly stated in 23 
Corpus Juris, 470, where the following appears in 
summary; "A Motion to quash the levy is not a 
proper proceeding to try the question of title to 
property, and the court will not set aside a levy 
upon the motion of a party solely on the ground 
that the officer has seized property of a stranger to 
the writ, or on the ground that the judgment debtor 
has no interest in the property levied on. So 
the court will not entertain a motion by a 
stranger, whose property has been levied upon, to 
vacate the levy, because the court will not in this 
manner determine conflicting titles to property; 
the stranger will be left to the statutory method of 
trying his right to the property/ ' 
The foregoing is taken from Corpus Juris. There are 
other cases cited under this section in Corpus Juris and 
we quote from 33 C.J.S. Sec. 144 (e) p. 332: 
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"Except as statutes provide otherwise, ordinarily 
none but parties to the principal action who are 
liable to be injured may move to quash the execu-
tion. The court may act on its own motion in the 
case of a void writ." 
We know of no rule or statute which has changed 
the substantive law that we have quoted above and we 
have found no case in which the rule has been changed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We submit that there was never a valid release issued. 
That the Meeks relied upon the McGhie Land Title Com-
pany and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation and the 
Title Insurance Policy and the Meeks would have recourse 
against the Title Company and as a practical matter they 
are being taken care of by the Title Company. That the 
McGhie Land Title Company and Lawyers Title Insur-
ance Corporation knew they had to have a release from 
the attorney and they were responsible for the Title and 
that they either took a calculated risk or were negligent 
in not checking the record and contacting the attorney for 
the Plaintiff. 
We submit that no valid release was given and there 
was no estoppel and that no injunction should have been 
issued and that execution should issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS AND 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Third Party 
Defendants and Appellant 
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